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II*—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SENSES
by Matthew Nudds
ABSTRACT Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how
and why we count five senses (the counting question); none of the standard
accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the
significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I
provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an
account of the senses and answering the counting question.
I
It is surprising, given the obviousness of the fact that we havefive senses, that there should be so little agreement as to what
account should be given of them. It’s not just that there is dis-
agreement over details; the disagreement concerns the funda-
mental nature of the senses. With a few notable exceptions,1
discussions of the senses have attempted to answer what might
be called the counting question: that is, why do we count five
senses? In order to answer that question, some account must be
given of the difference in virtue of which different particular per-
ceptions (by perceptions I mean events of perceiving something)
count as of different senses, and of what different particular per-
ceptions have in common, in virtue of which they are perceptions
of a single sense. By explaining in virtue of what perceptions
are perceptions of a particular sense, an adequate answer to the
counting question can claim to have given an account of the
nature of the senses—of what constitutes each of the different
senses.
There is agreement in general about what properties of percep-
tions might be relevant to answering the counting question, and
I don’t think it is an over-simplification to say that attempts to
answer this question, and hence accounts of the nature of the
senses, can be divided into three broad categories: the three stan-
dard accounts of the nature of the senses.
1. See, for example, Martin (1992, 1993); and discussions of Molyneux’s question in
Campbell (1996) and Eilan (1993).
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First, there are accounts which claim that perceptions count
as of different senses in virtue of the causal aetiology of their
production. Thus, the senses might be claimed to be distinct in
virtue of the role of the sense organs, or of psychological pro-
cesses, or of different physical stimuli2 in the production of
perceptions.
Secondly, there are accounts which claim that perceptions
count as of different senses in virtue of what objects or properties
they are perceptions of. The perception, for example, of colour
might be claimed to constitute seeing, the perception of a sound,
hearing, and so on.3
Thirdly, there are accounts which claim that perceptions count
as of different senses in virtue of properties of the experiences
involved. One perceives something with a particular sense in vir-
tue of one’s experience of that thing having a certain kind of
experiential property.4
Dispute about the nature of the senses is (for the most part)
about which of the three kinds of account is correct. Although
each account might be thought to be partially correct—in that
it captures something characteristic of the difference between
senses—none of the accounts has been generally accepted.
Proponents of each kind of view have what seem to me decisive
objections against the alternative views. Given that there are only
ever these few alternatives canvassed, writers tend to adopt the
view they consider to have the fewest or least serious short-
comings. In what follows I will begin by briefly describing the
standard accounts, and the more or less standard objections to
them; having done that, I will argue that the counting question
can only be answered after we have answered a different question
about the significance of the distinction between the senses.5
2. I’ve put physical stimuli here on the assumption that physical stimuli contribute
only to how an experience is caused and not to what is experienced; if the nature of
the stimulus is taken to make a difference to what is experienced, then the physical
stimuli account should be considered to belong to the second kind of account.
3. Aristotle is popularly thought to have held this view; but see Everson (1997), Ch.
3. For more recent advocates, see Roxbee-Cox (1970); Sanford (1976); for a version
couched in terms of the intentional theory of perception, see Dretske (1995), pp. 94ff..
4. See Grice (1967); Smith (1991). Peacocke (1982, Ch. 2) endorses a similar view.
5. There may be some views that don’t fit neatly into my scheme of classification; I
think that some version of the general objections that I raise will apply to them too.
The problem, as I shall attempt to show, cannot be solved by refining or combining
the standard views.
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II
Causal Aetiology—The Sense Organs View.
A familiar type of answer [to the question by what criteria the
senses are to be distinguished from one another] is that certain
physiological processes, involving certain parts of the body with
which we are familiar, make an instance of perception a case of
sight; the functioning of other processes, involving other familiar
parts of the body, make it a case of hearing, etc. This may be
called the ‘Sense Organ’ view.6
Many people, if asked what the difference between seeing and
hearing something amounts to, will answer by pointing out the
role of our eyes in seeing, and our ears in hearing and so on.7
It’s natural to suggest, therefore, that in distinguishing different
senses we are making a distinction between the different sense
organs involved in perception.
Insofar as there is a correlation between different senses and
different sense organs, and insofar as we don’t, as a matter of
fact, make a distinction between two senses unless there are two
different sense organs involved in perceiving with each, this
suggestion seems right; it is the most natural way of developing
the causal aetiology view. Philosophically speaking, however, it
is unpopular; indeed it is taken by many to be simply untenable.
An account of the senses needs to explain more that what dis-
tinguishes different senses; it must explain what all the percep-
tions of a single sense have in common in virtue of which they
count as perceptions of that sense.
Pointing out merely that various distinguishable parts of the
body are involved in producing those perceptions is not sufficient
to explain that, for there are lots of distinguishable parts of the
body—there are hands, and feet, and legs, and torsos, and so
on—which are (or, at least, can be) involved in perceiving which
we don’t take to produce perceptions of distinct senses. We need,
therefore, some further explanation of why we group various
parts of the body into five different kinds of sense organ. The
worry is then that the only way to explain this grouping is either
6. Roxbee-Cox (1970), p. 530.
7. Try asking. It’s not insignificant that people generally answer in this way.
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by appealing to the fact that they produce perceptions of differ-
ent senses, making the explanation circular, or by appealing to
one of the other accounts of the distinction, making the expla-
nation otiose.8
In response to this, it might be suggested that the sense organs
are not simply distinguishable parts of the body; they are, rather,
the physiological mechanisms whose functioning is necessary for
parts of the body to function in perception. They are, as one
textbook says, ‘the bodily mechanisms for getting up-to-date
information’ about one’s own body and the surrounding
environment.9 In explaining how we count different sense organs,
and hence different senses, we can appeal to the role of these
bodily mechanisms.
This suggestion won’t work; we can see why by considering
the example of touch. One might think of the sense organ of
touch as the skin. Certainly we talk of feeling or touching many
properties or features of things that we detect by means of con-
tact with the skin. The skin, however, does not contain a single
sensory mechanism, but several: ‘There are at least 15 func-
tionally and morphologically distinct kinds,’ including those
which detect temperature and various mechanically sensitive
receptors.10 We regard things that we perceive as a result of the
operation of any or several of these distinct mechanisms as things
that we perceive by touch, so we cannot simply identify the sense
of touch with the operation of a certain kind of bodily mechan-
ism. A similar argument can be made with respect to the other
senses.
At this point we can either say that the distinction, as we actu-
ally make it, between five senses is mistaken and embrace a kind
of eliminativism or revisionism about the senses (we might say
that there are no senses as common-sense understands them, or
that there are many more than common-sense recognises); or we
8. Roxbee-Cox (1970) p. 533 is not unique in concluding ‘There is some element
common to the members of the groups of parts of the body that we call organs of
sight, feeling, etc., . . . To find such a feature, we shall . . . have to fall back on such
considerations as the character of the experience or the properties perceived, that are
associated with the functioning of the various organs’.
9. Barlow and Mollon 1982, pp. 1 and 10.
10. Iggo (1982); this paper contains a good general survey of the physiology of
cutaneous sensory mechanisms.
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can reject the claim that the senses are sense organs. The elimini-
tivist or revisionist view is only plausible if it can be shown that
common-sense embodies the kind of proto-scientific understand-
ing of the senses which is liable to revision or replacement. I’ve
not come across a good argument that it does.11
Appealing to the role of the sense organs is just one way to
mark differences in the aetiology of perceptions; of course there
are others. One might accept that perceptions cannot be dis-
tinguished by appealing to physiological mechanisms, but still
think that there must be some kind of processes involved in pro-
ducing perceptions, distinctions amongst which correspond to
the distinctions we make amongst perceptions: we just need to
identify the relevant kind of processes. Kinds of psychological
processes might be thought to be especially relevant, or kinds of
physiological process individuated in some more subtle way.
In fact, there are no good reasons for thinking that there are
such processes;12 but even if they existed, it is arguable that they
would be irrelevant to distinguishing the senses. They would be
irrelevant because there is no process the operation of which is
necessary for one’s perception of something to be of a particular
sense; as E.J. Lowe comments,
It is not inconceivable that a congenitally blind person (one whose
eyes or optic nerves were damaged beyond repair) should be cap-
able of enjoying [visual] experiences and have sight conferred arti-
ficially by being fitted with a prosthetic device ... What qualifies an
experience as visual has nothing to do with its causal provenance
... Qualitative character is what counts.13
11. There have been authors who attempt to give a ‘scientific’ account of the senses;
but they do nothing to show that they haven’t simply changed the subject. Whatever
they are giving an account of, it’s not the senses as we commonly understand them.
Cf. Keeley (2002): 1–24.
12. Psychological processes, for example, don’t divide neatly into processes corre-
sponding to different senses. I don’t have space to go into details. The reason, briefly,
is that lower-level perceptual processes are massively modular, with many distinct
feature specific processes involved in producing, say, visual perceptions. Higher-level
perceptual processes are task dependent, with distinct processes involved in, say, visu-
ally guided action and visual recognition. Both higher and lower-level processes can
have cross-modal inputs; that is, they have a functionally significant role in producing
perceptions of more than one sense. Given this psychological structure, there seems
little prospect of identifying five kinds of psychological process corresponding to the
five senses. Much of this evidence with respect to vision is summarised in Milner and
Goodale (1995). See also Massaro (1998) and Bregman (1990).
13. Lowe (1992), p. 80.
MATTHEW NUDDS6
As long as a prosthetic device performed the same function as
that performed by the eye and associated mechanisms—as long
as it produced visual experiences of objects—then a prosthetic
device would confer sight. A similar line or reasoning applies
with respect to any other kind of prosthetic sensory mechanism
and any other sense.
The details of this argument—in particular, what grounds the
claim about conceivability, and what follows from that—are
rarely made explicit. Presumably the idea is that all one has to
do to imagine having a visual experience is to imagine having an
experience which is subjectively just like the experience one has
when actually seeing something. If imagining having an experi-
ence subjectively just like the experience one actually has when
seeing something is sufficient for one to imagine having a visual
experience, then having an experience subjectively just like a vis-
ual experience is sufficient for that experience to be a visual
experience. And if being subjectively alike is sufficient, then
nothing else is necessary. Thus an experience counts as a visual
experience irrespective of how it was produced—irrespective of
its causal aetiology. There is a great deal that could be said about
this argument,14 and there are a number of points at which it
could be resisted. Nevertheless, I think it, or something like it,
lies behind the widely accepted conclusion that the distinction
between the senses must be in some way experiential, a matter of
how experiences seem subjectively and nothing to do with the
sense organs or the causal aetiology of experience.
III
The Objects View. The view according to which perceptions
count as of different senses in virtue of the kind of objects they
are perceptions of counts as experiential because how perceptual
experiences seem is (at least partly) determined by what they are
experiences of. As an account of the senses,15 the view does not
fare well; one problem concerns the diversity of objects perceiv-
able with each sense, as Sorabji remarks:
14. Kripke (1980), pp. 151–155, presents what I think is a version of this argument.
See Peacocke (1985), Section IV, for a discussion critical of the general approach.
15. An account sometimes attributed to Aristotle. But see Sorabji (1971), pp. 55–79,
and Everson (1997), Ch. 3.
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There is such a large variety of objects that can be perceived by
sight . . . it would be laborious to define sight by reference to it
objects. Moreover it would conceal what unity there is to the con-
cept, and make it a mystery that the single name ‘sight’ should be
used to cover such a heterogeneous list.16
A more serious problem is that the same kind of object can be
perceived with more than one sense; that means we cannot
explain why perceptions count as of different senses simply by
appealing to the kind of objects perceived.17
Rather than appealing to the objects perceived, it might be
thought more plausible that perceptions count as of different sen-
ses in virtue of the kind of properties perceived. There are two
ways of developing this suggestion. The first is that perceptions
count as of different senses in virtue of the kind of properties the
objects perceived are perceived as having. The second is that
objects are perceived in virtue of, or by, perceiving certain ‘key’
properties, and perceptions count as of different senses in virtue
of the kind of ‘key’ property involved. This second view is far
less common.
According to the first view, perceiving an object as having a
certain colour, shape, size, and so on, constitutes seeing that
object; perceiving an object as having a certain degree of loud-
ness, determinate of pitch, and so on, constitutes hearing that
object; and so on for the other senses. There are some properties
that objects can be perceived to have with more than one sense.
One can both see and feel the shape of something, for example.
In order to explain what makes the perception of the shape of
an object an instance of seeing that shape, the account must
appeal to the conjunction of properties one experiences an object
as having.18 One’s perception of the shape of an object is an
instance of seeing the shape if one perceives the object’s shape in
conjunction with other uniquely visual properties of the object.
16. (1971), p. 60; see also pp. 68–9.
17. Unless, that is, one adopts a sense-datum view of experience. According to some
versions of the sense-datum theory, the objects constitutive of, say, one’s visual
awareness are of a kind unique to that sense. Many would take the adoption of any
sense-datum view of experience too high a price to pay for an answer the counting
question, and I won’t discuss the possibility further. For a discussion of whether
sense-data should be thought to be cross-modal, see Robinson (1994), pp. 207 ff.
18. Cf. Grice (1967), pp. 267 ff.
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This account of the distinction is attractive to those who hold
a representational view of experience, according to which the
phenomenology of an experience can be exhaustively character-
ised in terms of the representational content of the experience—
in terms of how it represents the world to be.19 If one combines
the representational view with the view that the senses must be
distinguished experientially, then one ends up with the kind of
account of the senses recently endorsed by Dretske. The rep-
resentationalist can explain the difference between visual and tac-
tual experience because there is, Dretske says,
more—much more—involved in seeing an object move than
experiencing the object’s movement. One also experiences the
object’s shape, size, colour, direction of movement, and a host of
other properties. This is why seeing and feeling movement are
much different even though the same thing (movement) is rep-
resented in both modalities. Even when the senses overlap in their
representational efforts—as they do in the case of spatial proper-
ties—they represent different ranges of determinable properties.20
According to Dretske we can explain what makes one’s percep-
tion of an object’s shape a visual perception by appealing to the
range, or conjunction, of properties one perceives in perceiving
that object.21 The difficulty with this is that appealing to the con-
junction of properties perceived will allow us to distinguish dif-
ferent senses only for as long as the operation of each sense is
considered in isolation from the others.
When we see the shape of something our perception of the
shape will be a perception of it as having a conjunction of fea-
tures constitutive of visual experience. But suppose that, as we
often do, we simultaneously feel and see an object. Then we
would perceive the object’s shape in conjunction with kinds of
19. A view which is approaching the status of orthodoxy in the philosophy of
perception.
20. Dretske (1994), p. 95. McGinn (1988), p. 35 similarly suggests that ‘[although]
different sense-modalities may present the same kinds of environmental feature, e.g.
shape or texture—as with sight and touch . . . the subjectively distinct experiences
that present these features also present other features [The] differences in the range
of contents available to different types of experience seem enough to capture the
obvious phenomenological differences in the experiences associated with different
senses.’ I don’t know what he means here by ‘subjectively distinct experiences’.
21. This is in fact the version of the features account that Grice discusses (1967)
p. 251. See also Roxbee-Cox (1970).
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properties constitutive of both visual and tactual perception: we
would perceive the object as having shape, and colour, but also
as having weight, texture, and so on. In that case, we can no
longer explain what makes the perception of the object’s shape
visual by appealing to the fact that we are aware of its shape in
conjunction with properties uniquely associated with vision; we
are aware of the shape in conjunction with properties associated
with both vision and touch. Grice makes the point succinctly:
‘Suppose,’ he says, ‘a man be resting a half-crown on the palm of
one hand and a penny on the palm of the other: he might (perhaps
truthfully) say, ‘The half-crown looks to me larger than the penny,
though they feel the same size.’ If we simply list the properties
perceived by the subject we face a problem: ‘There is nothing in
this statement of the facts to tell whether the coins look different
in size but feel the same size, or alternatively feel different in size
but look the same size.’22
The only possible response to this objection is to insist that when
one both feels and sees a coin one has two experiences simul-
taneously—a tactual experience and a visual experience—and
that each experience will be different in that each will represent
the coin to have a different range of properties in addition to its
shape. But what grounds could there be for such a claim? Prior
to having distinguished visual and tactual experience one could
have no reason for claiming that one has two distinct experiences
of the coin—a tactual experience representing tactually perceived
properties, and a visual one representing visually perceived
properties—rather than a single experience which represents
both tactually and visually perceived properties.23
The second, and less popular, way of developing the properties
account of the senses is to claim that there are objects or proper-
ties associated with each sense which play a special role in the
perception of anything else with that sense; and that perceptions
can be distinguished by reference to these special objects or
22. Grice (1967), p. 253. Note that appealing to a mismatch between vision and touch
is inessential: the same argument could be made if one felt but did not see the shape
of the coin. Then we could ask, in virtue of what is the perception of the shape an
instance of feeling the shape?
23. All they can appeal to in providing such an explanation is our awareness of the
coin and its properties nothing about that awareness provides any basis for the claim
that two distinct experiences are involved in our perception of it.
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properties. One version of it is developed by Roxbee-Cox; not
all the properties we perceive, he says, ‘are of equal standing’.
Instead:
When we perceive something to have a property that [is perceiv-
able with more than one sense] the property will be one the percep-
tion of which on any particular occasion requires the . . .
perception of one or other of the special properties I am calling
Key Features.24
The suggestion, then, is that the perception of, say, the shape of
something requires the perception of its colour, and in virtue of
that the perception is an instance of seeing. Whether the percep-
tion of the shape of something does require the perception of its
colour is an empirical matter. There is little reason to think that
it does, nor that in general there are properties that play this
special role in perception. That gives us a good reason to reject
the account.25
IV
The Experiences View. It is the inadequacy of the accounts that
I have so far considered that leads Grice to conclude that the
senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the special intro-
spectible character of our experience; which ‘resists both inspec-
tion and description’ (p. 259). When we describe our visual
experiences, we do so
in terms of the way things look to us, and such a description obvi-
ously involves the use of property-words. But in addition to the
specific differences between visual experiences, signalised by the
various property words employed, there is a generic resemblance
signalised by the use of the word ‘look’, which differentiates visual
from non-visual sense experience. This difference can be noticed
and labelled, but perhaps not further described.26
24. Roxbee-Cox (1970), p. 537.
25. There’s evidence that the psychological processes involved in the perception of
shape and colour are dissociable, hence that it’s possible to perceive the shape of
something without perceiving its colour.
26. Grice (1967), p. 267. Cf. Peacocke (1982), pp. 27–8: ‘The sensational properties
of visual and tactual perception are toto caelo distinct . . . It does not follow that
the representational contents of visual and tactual experiences do not overlap . . .the
distinctness of visual and tactual experience is captured at the sensational level.’
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We can distinguish the senses by appealing to the properties of
experiences which determine what Grice calls their special intro-
spectible character.27
One thing in favour of this suggestion is that, unlike the other
views that I have considered, it does seem able to provide an
answer to the counting question. Trivially so, one might think:
the relevant properties can be introduced functionally, just as
those properties of experience that explain what distinguishes
perceptions of different senses.
Of course, introducing properties in this way doesn’t guarantee
that there actually are any such properties. What reason, other
than that they would explain the distinction between senses, do
we have for thinking that they exist? That is, what reason do we
have for thinking that experiences have properties which partly
determine their subjective character, and that there are five
properties each corresponding to one of the five senses?
Grice suggests that there is a generic resemblance amongst the
experiences associated with the perceptions of a particular sense.
If there is such a resemblance, and that resemblance cannot be
explained in any other way, then that would give us a reason for
thinking that the properties exist.
Both conjuncts of the antecedent are disputable. First, it’s not
clear that there is a generic resemblance of the kind Grice
describes. That is, it’s not clear that any experience involved in
the visual perception of an object is such that it resembles other
such experiences more than it resembles any experience involved
in, say, the tactual perception of an object; and so on. Even if
there is this generic resemblance, it’s certainly not clear that we
have to introduce properties of experience in order to explain it.
We have seen that representationalists about experience think
that whatever resemblances there are amongst the experiences of
a single sense can be explained in terms of the representational
content of the experience; in terms, that is, of what is perceived.
I have argued that appealing to what is perceived is not sufficient
27. A similar view has recently been endorsed by Smith (1990), p. 239: ‘Necessarily,
when we consciously perceive a physical object, that object impinges on us in such a
way as to be registered in a sensory state. Such states possess, and are differentiated
by, intrinsic experiential features . . . To perceive a sound as a sound is to be sensorily
affected in a peculiar and indefinable way that differs from our sensory state involv-
ing, say, the perception of a colour. Such sensory characteristics of experience go to
define a sense modality.’
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to explain the distinction between the senses, it may nonetheless
be sufficient to explain this resemblance.28
The account, then, does not seem well motivated. We should
be suspicious of properties introduced for no other reason than
to explain the distinction between senses: although, if they
existed, they would explain the distinction, we have no good
independent reason to think they do exist. Furthermore, there
are many who would reject the account simply because of its
commitment to properties of experiences that determine the
introspectible character of those experiences. Such properties are
thought to be, in various ways, problematic.29
V
A Question of Significance. It seems, then, that none of the stan-
dard accounts that I have described can provide a wholly satis-
factory account of the nature of the senses. My discussion of
each has been brief, and it may that, with some modification or
combination of them, we could come up with a more satisfactory
account. I am not going to explore that possibility, because even
if we were able to produce a more satisfactory account, an
account that explains how we count the senses, such an account
would still not, I am going to suggest, provide an adequate expla-
nation of the distinction we make between the senses.
Our concepts of the five senses are everyday folk psychological
concepts, as central as any to our understanding of ourselves and
others. For most, if not all, folk psychological states, being in
a state of one kind, rather than another, matters; it has some
explanatory significance, often because being in that kind of state
has consequences for one’s judgement and action.
In giving an account of these folk psychological states, in say-
ing what makes them different from one another, we aim to spell
out these consequences; in giving an account of what is charac-
teristic of different kinds of psychological states we must give an
28. The ongoing dispute about the existence of qualia suggests that the need for
properties of experience cannot be established by appeal to introspection alone. A
nice example of the dispute as it applies to the senses can be found in the exchange
between Lopes (2000) and Dretske (2000).
29. Many seem to view such properties as being, like sense data, an affront to philo-
sophical good sense.
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account of their explanatory significance. It is plausible to think
that concepts of these different states are part of our folk psycho-
logical repertoire of concepts because of the explanatory signifi-
cance being in one rather than another such state has.
What, then, is the explanatory significance of the distinction
between the senses? It is, I suggest, a condition on any adequate
account of the nature of senses that it should be able to explain
the explanatory significance of the distinction. An account which
was extensionally adequate—which explained how we count the
senses—but which couldn’t or didn’t explain the point of our
counting them, would be inadequate. It would be inadequate
because it would be unable to explain the point of the distinction;
unable to explain why seeing rather than touching something
matters.
This suggests an alternative way of approaching the question
of the nature of the senses; rather than beginning with the count-
ing question, we should begin with the question of the signifi-
cance of the distinction.
None of the standard accounts provide a plausible answer.
They aim to describe some difference that corresponds to the
distinction we make, and so is sufficient to answer the counting
question, but this doesn’t explain why we make it.
Suppose, for example, that I perceive something—a vase on
the table, say. On each of the views that I have discussed of what
distinguishes the senses, what could it matter that I am perceiving
it with one rather than another sense?
According to the experiential view, the difference will be in
what properties my experience of the vase has. That my experi-
ence has these properties explains why it is appropriate to label
my experience as a visual experience, but whatever consequences
my seeing the vase has for my judgements and action, those
consequences all flow from the fact that I have perceive the vase
being some way. My not perceiving the vase at all, or perceiving
it as being some other way, would have different consequences,
but simply as a result of what I perceive. Therefore, the account
seems unable to explain why it should matter that I am, say,
seeing rather than touching the vase.
A similar line of reasoning applies to the objects or properties
account, according to which the difference between seeing and
touching the vase will be a difference in what properties of the
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vase I perceive. But again, whatever consequences my seeing the
vase has for my judgements and action, those consequences sim-
ply flow from the fact that I perceive the vase as being some way.
That my experience of the vase is, in virtue of the how I experi-
ence the vase to be, a ûisual experience, doesn’t have any further
consequences; it doesn’t explain anything not already explained
by the fact of my simply perceiving it. Again, then, the account
is unable to explain why it should matter that I am seeing rather
than touching the vase.
On both these accounts of the distinction, we could abandon
talk of the senses without loss. Given their account of what it is
to see or feel something, knowing that something was seen or felt
doesn’t add anything to knowing merely that it was perceived.
The same doesn’t seem to be true of the sense organs view. The
fact that part of my body is involved in my perception is poten-
tially explanatory of something. But what does it explain, and
why should we care about that?
VI
The Senses As Ways Of Perceiûing. Suppose that we are told not
simply that Alice perceived the vase, but that she saw it. What
do we come to know about Alice in virtue of being told that she
saw it? Or suppose that we are told that she touched the vase
rather than saw it. What do we come to know about her as a
consequence of that?
It is more informative to be told that Alice sees the vase, rather
than to be told merely that she perceives it, since her seeing it
makes it probable that she perceives that the vase is a certain
way. That is, her seeing the vase makes it more probably that
she perceives certain other properties of vase, properties such as
its shape, colour, location, and so on. Being told merely that she
perceives it doesn’t tell us anything about how she is likely to
have perceived the vase to be; it doesn’t tell us that it is more
probable that she perceived that the vase is any of the different
ways that it could be perceived to be. More generally:
If Alice sees a vase then there is a range of features, F, such that
she is likely to come to know that the vase is F.
If Alice touches a vase then there is a range of features, G, such
that she is likely to come to know that the vase is G.
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The range of features F and G are different. The same is true for
the other senses.
How Alice perceives the vase as being will have consequences
for her judgements and actions, so knowing that she is likely
to have perceived that the vase is a certain way is potentially
explanatory of her behaviour in a way that knowing merely that
she perceived the vase is not. This gives us an explanation of the
significance of the distinction between different senses. Its having
this significance explains why we distinguish the senses.
This explanation of the significance of the distinction exploits
the fact that we perceive objects in different ways. A way of per-
ceiving is just the conditions that have to be satisfied for us to
perceive something: the way we perceive an object is just that set
of conditions which are such that, had they not been satisfied,
we would not have perceived it. The very same things can be
perceived in more than one way; that is, in ways that involve the
satisfaction of different conditions. That there are different ways
of perceiving things is partly a consequence of the fact that we
have different sensory mechanisms; we can think of the operation
of these different mechanisms as constituting different ways of
perceiving something, though they are not the only ways of per-
ceiving something.30
On any occasion that we perceive an object, the conditions
whose satisfaction is necessary for our perceiving that object are
sufficient for our perceiving it as having a range of properties.
What range of properties we perceive the object as having
depends in part on which way we perceive the object. To take an
obvious example, different sensory mechanisms are sensitive to
different kinds of properties; therefore which range of features
we perceive an object as having will vary according to the sensory
mechanisms that are involved in our perceiving it.
Given, therefore, that one perceives some particular object,
how one perceives that object to be and what one can perceive
about it will depend in part upon the particular way that one
perceives it. In distinguishing different senses we are dis-
tinguishing different ways of perceiving: the senses just are differ-
ent ways of perceiving things.
30. There are as many different ways of perceiving as there are ways of individuating
the conditions necessary for perceiving something. I say something more about which
ways are relevant to the distinction between the senses below.
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Note that the account that I am proposing makes object per-
ception primary to our understanding of the senses. In dis-
tinguishing different senses, we are distinguishing different ways
of perceiving particular objects. Were we not able to perceive
objects in different ways, and were these different ways not
differentially correlated with the way we perceive objects as
being, we could have no use for concepts of different senses. It
is only because the same objects can be perceived in different
ways that it can be informative to know, of a particular percep-
tion of an object, which way it was perceived.
Note too that this explanation of the significance of the distinc-
tion between senses is essentially third-personal. It’s informative
for us to be told that Alice sees the vase, but what about for
Alice herself? What’s informative for us is clearly not informative
for Alice, since she already knows how she perceives the vase as
being, or at least she can come to know simply by attending to
the vase. So what difference does to make for her that her percep-
tion of the vase is an instance of seeing it?
Perhaps coming to know how one’s perceptual experience
came about can, in certain circumstances, be useful. Or perhaps
coming to know which way one perceives something is useful,
not because it tells one about one’s actual perception or about
one’s actual experience but because one comes to know some-
thing about what further experiences one could have in certain
circumstances. In particular, one might come to know what one
would have to do in order to find something out. For example,
if one sees something, then to discover what it feels like one
would have to do something different to what one would have
to do in order to discover what shape it has. Thus one might use
facts about which way one perceived something to guide one’s
further perceptual exploration.
Maybe we could explain the first-personal point of the distinc-
tion along these lines.31 It’s not clear, however, that such an
explanation is needed, because it’s not clear that the distinction
has any first-personal significance: I don’t think it matters to
Alice which way she perceives the vase. A third-personal expla-
nation of the significance of the distinction is sufficient to explain
31. I’m not sure such an explanation would ever be satisfactory, since—with very
few exceptions—it’s not clear that explicit knowledge of the causal conditions for
perceiving something is involved in perceptual exploration.
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why in general we make the distinction; we do not need, there-
fore, a first-personal explanation.
VII
The Counting Question. I have suggested that the senses are dif-
ferent ways of perceiving things, and that that explains their sig-
nificance, but how does that help us answer the counting
question? There are many conditions necessary for perceiving
something. These conditions are of different kinds: there are vari-
ous physical conditions—such as the presence of light for seeing;
there are various psychological conditions having to do with the
proper functioning of various sensory processes; there are
relational conditions—looking in the right direction, touching
something, and so on. Given the way that I characterised a way
of perceiving—as a set of conditions necessary for the perception
of something—there are as many different particular ways of
perceiving as there are ways of individuating these necessary con-
ditions. Simply saying that the senses are ways of perceiving
doesn’t tell us what they are because it doesn’t tell us which of
these many ways of perceiving they are. It doesn’t tell us which
ways of perceiving are relevant to the distinction we actually
make between different senses. So what exactly determines which
ways of perceiving correspond to each of the senses, and why do
we classify ways of perceiving into five different senses?
The three standard accounts that I discussed in the first half
of this paper all attempt to answer the counting question by
locating some appropriate distinction in nature corresponding to
that we make between the senses.32 It might be thought that we
need to locate a natural distinction if we are both to explain
the widespread—perhaps universal33—nature of the distinction
between fiûe senses, and establish that our judgements involving
concepts of different senses are genuinely truth-apt. It emerged
from that discussion that it is difficult to find any natural distinc-
tion which plausibly corresponds to the distinction as we actually
32. By a distinction in nature I mean at least a distinction which exists independently
of our practice of marking it.
33. There is some evidence that the distinction is not universal, that some communi-
ties draw the distinction between senses in a different way to us; see Howes (1991).
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make it. In particular, it emerged that there is no natural distinc-
tion between kinds of sensory mechanism.
We can answer the counting question, however, without
appealing to any natural distinction. It is a familiar point about
the nature of conventions that if doing something the same way
as others has utility for each member of a group of people then
we can explain why all members of that group do something the
same way as being a matter of convention.34 This is so even if
their doing something the particular way they do is arbitrary.
Given my account of the significance of the senses, making a
distinction between senses will have far greater utility if we all
make roughly the same distinction. Therefore, if the senses are
ways of perceiving we can explain the widespread nature of the
distinction we make between fiûe senses as being a consequence
of the existence of a convention to individuate ways of perceiving
in a certain manner, and our judgements involving concepts of
the senses as being true in virtue of such a convention.
Thus we can explain both the widespread nature of the distinc-
tion, and the truth-aptness of our judgements involving concepts
of the senses, without supposing that there is anything natural
or non-arbitrary about the distinction. Although we needn’t sup-
pose that the distinction is other than arbitrary, it doesn’t follow
that there are no constraints on how we individuate ways of per-
ceiving. Again, these constraints follow from my account of the
significance of the distinction. The fact we distinguish ways of
perceiving because it can be informative to know which way
someone perceives something will place various pragmatic con-
straints on how we individuate ways of perceiving.
In the first place there won’t be any point in our distinguishing
ways of perceiving that are not potentially informative. Thus the
conditions we distinguish must be differentially correlated with a
significant difference in what is likely to have been perceived.
That someone perceives something with their left eye rather than
their right eye makes no difference to what they are likely to have
perceived; so there would be no point in regarding left and right
eye perception as involving different senses. Touching something
with hands rather than feet may make a difference, but not a
sufficient difference to be worth tracking.
34. See Lewis (1969) and Burge (1975), pp. 249–254.
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Secondly, there is no point in making a distinction for the pur-
poses of telling what people are likely to perceive if we cannot
actually tell or detect which way they perceive something. Fur-
thermore, such a distinction would only be useful if we can easily
tell which way someone perceives something. That means we
would not distinguish ways of perceiving in terms of the satisfac-
tion of various psychological conditions. Similarly, although
what someone can perceive about something they touch depends
on how they touch it, the difficulty in telling how someone is
touching something, together with the relative insignificance of
the differences in they are likely to have perceived, would make
distinguishing different ways of touching of little practical value.
Thus, the conditions whose satisfaction we will take to be rel-
evant to whether two perceptions of an object have been pro-
duced in the same way will be obvious and detectable, and
strongly correlated with differences in what properties that object
is likely to have been perceived as having.
Given these constraints, one would expect a close connection
between the different senses and the various parts of the body
that are involved in perception,35 but there is no reason to think
that the constraints determine a distinction. Exactly how we indi-
viduate ways of perceiving is a matter for empirical investigation
of how people actually categorise perceptions, of what conditions
they take to be relevant to deciding with which sense someone
perceives something.
VIII
Some Consequences. The view of the senses that I am advocating
has various attractive consequences; I only have space to very
briefly mention two. The account explains why the sense organs
are so central to our understanding of the senses, but it does so
without appealing to the sense organs to answer the counting
question. Since the sense organs don’t do any individuating
work, it doesn’t matter that we cannot individuate them indepen-
dently of the senses. What about the objection that having an
experience of a certain subjective kind is sufficient for one to be,
35. This is why I said earlier that it is not insignificant that, when asked what makes
a perception a case of seeing or touching, people (unfailingly in my experience) men-
tion the role of the eyes and the hands.
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say, seeing something? More needs to be said about that argu-
ment but, according my account, having a certain kind of experi-
ence may be sufficient, as things actually are, for a perception to
be an instance of seeing; it doesn’t follow that it would be suf-
ficient in all circumstances. It is sometimes asked whether, if we
acquired a new ability to detect some previously undetectable
property—of magnetic fields, for example—we should count the
exercise of that ability as the exercise of a new sense. My account
of the senses doesn’t say anything about such ‘new’ senses, nor
does it say any about what senses we would have in counterfac-
tual situations. Since what senses we distinguish is conventional,
and we don’t know what conventions would exist in such circum-
stances, there is simply no answer to these questions. That seems
to me to be consistent with—indeed, explanatory of—our lack
of strong intuitions about counterfactual cases. The appeal to
conventions also explains the vagueness in our judgements about
non-paradigm cases: the conventions may simply not provide a
determinate answer as to which sense is involved when percep-
tions are produced in non-paradigmatic ways. Again, that
explains the fact that we don’t generally know what to say about
such cases.
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